PATS

Privacy Awareness Through Security Organisation Branding

Mapping the Security Regimes

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Dr. Leon Hempel

Carla Ilten

Michael Carius

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A. Introduction

This Synthesis Report is the final Deliverable of the PATS Work Package 2 – Security Agencies and Actors. The aim of this Work Package has been to structure and map the field of civil security in the partner countries in a reasonable and systematic manner on the basis of a general historical reconstruction since 1989, i.e., the end of bipolarity. It explores the basis for a qualitative as well as quantitative understanding of the development of current security regimes and industry structures. It provides the "big picture" while at the same time offering a comparative view on the partners' countries.

The analysis of not only actors in the field of security, but also discourses and technological developments, turned out very fruitful and rich. Firstly, notions of security were analysed, secondly, institutional changes were described and thirdly, a range of case studies was conducted in order to draft typologies of actors.

This synthesis will provide short summaries for all National Reports. In a next step, the broad lines of security regime development and the related theses will be discussed in order to synthesise results on a new analytical level. The guiding question here is whether general trends and developments can be identified for the countries analysed. Lastly, evidence for selected points made in this conceptual part will be given through a short description of relevant findings in the countries.

B. Point of Departure: Security Regimes as a Function of Threat?

Our first approach to synthesising the findings from the National Reports is to focus on the similarities that point to general trends and mechanisms in the observed developments. A key underlying assumption of PATS and its conceptualisation was that a major shift in security regimes has occurred as of 1989 – the end of the Cold War era. 1989 is a focus event indeed - from a global, but especially from a European perspective. However, other events have triggered an extension of security regimes much earlier in some of the countries, and some aspects of extension have fundamentally different roots. The main arguments and concepts that were elaborated in this Work Package will now be discussed along the common, but rather simplistic assumption that security regimes evolve according to threats that are posed to them. Security experts express the strategy that new threats need to be met with new answers in terms of action and policies. At the same time, these new security answers– security technologies and practices – constantly demand new kinds of threats. As is very well known from the history of the military sector, security has and will always connect political as well economic interests. Both go very much hand in hand - creating demand for "security production" through "politics of fear" in order to claim political agency or to sell new products.

Security Notions Broad and Narrow
A basic variable of security regimes is the prevailing notion and definition of "security". The reports of the six participating countries of the PATS project, Finland, Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and Israel, suggest that cultural and historical differences play a major role here, and one should speak of "securities" rather than security (cf. Burgess 2009). Still, the

question remains whether common developments can be traced in the evolution of the notions, and whether changing threats have been a powerful source of security definition.

A broad range of security notions can be found among the partner countries. The narrowest security notion is represented in the Hebrew term of "bitachon" – it refers to physical security only. When the term is used, it is quite clear what kind of security is meant and how significant it is. Physical security is simply a priority in a situation of constant conflict and threat. This general preoccupation cannot be ignored for Israel. Security in the sense of freedom from the threat of physical harm as a value is very highly regarded by Israeli citizens. In contrast, security notions have historically been broad in European countries such as Germany and Poland, where social and economic stability are also subsumed under the term security and employed especially on the part of the conservative camp. For instance, in the German Handbook of Staatsrecht, Sicherheit is defined focussing on the internal as follows:

> "Leaving foreign security out, what remains is security of jobs, social security and supply security (of food, goods and energy), currency security, technological security including nuclear plants, security of epidemics, fire and natural disasters, security of vehicle and aircraft traffic, and finally, "internal Security" as permanently present security requirement posed to the state by everyone." (Götz 1988 p.1008)

A second line of differences can be found in the direction of security focus: the US, Israel and Poland, for example, have historically developed a security focus directed outwards, to external threats. Other European countries have focused more on internal issues, while the military sector is dedicated to external threats. The internal-external threat poles however have merged in some of the countries analysed, leading to a perceived continuum of military and civil security threats that are answered with institutional changes. The European integration process is of specific interest in this respect. As of the early 1990s it shows a clear shift towards defining security from the outside.

While differences remain significant, a common tendency towards qualitative extension of the term is observable. Safety and security are already the same term in German – "Sicherheit" – they now are merged ever more into new concepts of security – comprehensive, holistic, networked, global security, to name a few examples from the emerging vocabulary. The convergence of different securities into one seems to be both a rhetoric strategy for legitimising institutional centralisation, but is also triggered by security technologies that allow multiple use and integration, for example in monitoring devices. This convergence of different conceptual layers of security has meanwhile found its symbolic referent object in critical infrastructures such as communication grids or power, gas and water utilities - a top security issue in the US, Europe or Israel. The increasing complexity and interdependencies of infrastructures symbolise societal vulnerability in the current discourse and thus put security of supply infrastructures on the agenda of research programmes. Their protection combines the issues of security and safety and, from a historical point of view, the security with the military sector.

The extension of the security term and hence scope is widely justified with new threats. While talk about the "new" terrorism is tightly coupled to the September 11 attacks in the US, earlier shifts in threat perception, for example in the EU, have induced broad institutional and programmatic changes.

The Transnationalisation of Threats

If security regimes evolved parallel to threats, then countries who perceive similar threats would develop similar security regimes – biased by their historical and cultural singularity, but showing a clear common tendency. The figure of "shared threats" tries to capture this state of commonality.

A European Shared Threat: Organised Crime

In the European Union countries, a range of shared threats appears in the discourse over the course of the European integration process. These discourses of securing European borders have in fact been medium and expression of the underlying struggle for identity formation. Security serves to delineate a European identity: Where does Europe start, and where is the defence line? Who is entitled to membership and free movement, and accordingly: Who remains excluded? Hence, since the 1980s integration efforts have focused more and more on the construction of security as a common responsibility and competence. As Ole Waever notions: "In the European version of order/ security, there is a state building logic at play. Security is invoked in a sense that can be interpreted as a call to defend a not yet-existing social order." (Waever 1995 p.74)

Security is both a vehicle for and organising principle of the political integration process – a process of integration and exclusion (cf. Monar 2000). A first important emergence of new and shared threats is set before 1989: the Schengen Agreement on a borderless zone within Europe (but not congruent with it) of 1985. The plan to remove borders between a set of states shifted the concentration to the now outer borderlines with non-European countries. A specific shared fear of what has come to be termed "organised crime" has unified the Schengen countries, and with the integration of Schengen into the EU framework, EU security policymakers.

With 1989 and the end of Cold War bipolarity, the perspective shifted towards the Eastern European candidates and the need to adapt their security regimes and border control systems to the newly emerging EU standards. A complex process of communication about threats and their visibility to all actors starts – social and cultural ideas need to be translated, interests negotiated and eventually threats defined. The focus was on organised crime which was now perceived as the prime problem of both the EU and all of its members. The threat loomed – just as before 1989 – behind the former Iron Curtain: Eastern Europe. The instability of post-communist countries with all its side effects, the fear of a "balkanisation of Europe" and the general failing of states led to a diffuse threat scenario of organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal migration that was faced not by nation states, but by the European Union.

The broad picture of economic globalisation and increasing mobility added to this vision of borderless crime: seen that structures of organised crime resemble legal economic processes very closely, it was assumed that organised crime, too, was undergoing modernisation and globalisation (cf. Glaeßner and Lorenz 2005 p.22). Since organised crime was perceived as border-crossing, security measures had to be supra-national, too. Organised crime thus worked as the negative of "freedom of movement", a natural contingency of mobility to be countered with further political integration measures – towards securitisation. In another perspective, security resources were reallocated from pre-1989 structures to new fields of activity, as is visible in the constitution of new institutions such as the Bundespolizei (former Border Protection) and the set-up of whole new border protection systems such as in Poland (through Siemens). Following Wyn Rees, the fight of the allegedly Eastern European sourced organised crime can be understood as a continuation of Cold

War patterns with new instruments – especially since security experts were looking for new fields of activity:

> "Securitising the issue of organised crime through an elite-driven process could be seen as a way of ensuring that the material resources and the political will mobilised against the eastern bloc was not dissipated in the 1990s. Such a process has arguably provided a new rationale for the development of structures of cooperation and integration on the European continent once the unifying threat of communism had disappeared." (Rees 2003 p.116)

European Shared Solutions

Still, even when threats are shared, national legal and practical idiosyncrasies persist in security regimes, hindering cooperation and handling of the perceived new challenges. The solution from the EU perspective lies in the creation of a second, partially independent regime – a supra-national entity capable of joining the different national regimes without replacing them. A key concept of this two-level structure is "mutual recognition based on trust" of the other's norms and definitions. The idea behind this structure is to save sovereignty and build a coherent "security network", as EU justice commissioner Reding has recently emphasised.

Since the interoperability of law is not given, the availability of information and interoperability of heterogeneous systems are pursued as powerful instruments for technically mediated integration of the national systems. This idea of eased integration through abstraction of a hidden variety is not unproblematic, though. The Schengen Information System – introduced as a core piece of security "compensation" (Glaeßner and Lorenz 2005 p.30) for free movement -, for example, is a hub-and-spoke infrastructure where national databases N-SIS provide copies of the central C-SIS that are frequently updated. With the principle of mutual recognition, entries into the database gain a life of their own: once multiplied into several databases, they are not easily erased from them, but rather reintroduced via the central hub. A national entity can thus not manipulate an unjust entry in all databases. The importance of this constellation becomes clear when looking at the imbalanced statistics of use – some countries issue Art. 99 alerts frequently while others do not at all.

Within this context of failing or slow convergence of national systems of policing, education, technology employment or justice, security becomes functional through its unifying mechanisms. Threats have played a central role here, and the September 11, 2001 attacks have again catalysed the construction of a shared threat, even though not as smoothly as organised crime discourses – but effectively on the level of lawmaking and policy change. The legitimising power of threat construction and communication is even more visible for the "new terrorism" discourse – but also its disconnection from actual threats and hence its instrumentalization on the part of national actors as a detour for law and order policy via the EU framework.

A Global Threat? International Terrorism

A new threat has materialised in the September 11 attacks in the USA leading to a major shift in US security policy and notion, and it has come to be the most significant shared threat among a range of countries in the last decade.

9/11 catalysed an "inward" move of the US security focus that had been shifting since the end of the Cold War era. The previous focus on traditional, existential, state-level threats gave way to a consideration of own vulnerabilities, capabilities, and risks. This focus event turned the domestic domain from a supposedly secure place into a threat level "yellow – orange - red" area. Civil security,

national security and personal security all became a matter of "homeland security". The new term shows the shift of threat from long-distance war threat which has never materialised to an asymmetric terrorist threat on the very grounds of the US.

What seems particularly important for the construction and sharing of this new threat is its provenance and scope. The new image of the "international" – Islamist - terrorist is one of a highly organised individual operating within a network, probably even highly educated (in engineering) and integrated in some Western society but drawn to a fundamentalist position out of religious fervour. It is this picture that has connected the threat to the US to European countries, especially those with Muslim population. While direct post-9/11 European solidarity was mostly based on identification with the attacked Western lifestyle and ideology, the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London attacks turned the threat of the "new" terrorism into a shared one between the EU and the USA. Its role in propagating an extended security notion can be shown in the "Homeland Security" term which is picked up by many European actors and implies e.g. the employ of armies on the "home" grounds of a state (cf. Clarke 2006).

Security's Function for the EU

Important differences exist among the European countries who share this threat. While devastating terrorist attacks have been performed in the UK and Spain, Germany has come into view as a country where terrorists have studied and prepared. This is the link to another threat already discussed – organised crime. Terrorism of this "new" kind is perceived as based on organised crime for it requires large resources and seems to be organised in some sort of network structure. Eventually, this threat links up with EU efforts to impede immigration and secure outer borders – to subsume migration policy under the security framework in general. While a dissonance between the described image of the new Islamist terrorist and the subjects of migration policy exists, (national) law making and institutional developments have fostered the connection of migration – organised crime – terrorism into a threat axis (cf. Wagner 2008).

The focus event 9/11 was successfully leveraged by EU politicians to become a point of departure for a common security and foreign policy. Starting with an extraordinary meeting on Sep.21 2001, the European Council defined the fight on terrorism as a prime goal of European policy and introduced a range of anti-terrorism measures. New laws, new competences and more information sharing were forwarded in order to work towards a coordinated and comprehensive – "interdisciplinary" - approach to security. In short, security was extended both qualitatively and quantitatively. Still, important terms such as "terrorism" could not ultimately be defined on a common basis (cf. Glaeßner and Lorenz 2005 p.32). After the 2004 Madrid attacks, faster translation of EU initiatives into national law was demanded. Again, the two-level structure persists: a real convergence of juridical and administrative regimes of member states is not desired.

To sum up, two European securities can be differentiated: a national level of security regimes with distinct security notions and terms, and an emerging supra-ordinate European security regime that has not security notion of its own. It remains strangely dependent on the national security regimes but attempts to dissolve them at the same time. While national sovereignties must be preserved, security and the construction of a common regime have been moved to centre stage of the integration process and the dynamics of Europeanization. Starting out as measures of compensation for integration process contingencies, common security policies gained thrust through focus events such as terrorist attacks. Still, those policies that extended member states capacities were more

readily accepted. The European Warrant, for example, took years to unfold and only came to be decided upon right after 9/11 – only to be delayed again through non-translation into national law by several states until the Madrid attacks in 2004, when the law finally came into force. Shared threats thus play a central role for the construction of this supra-national security regime that lacks a common security notion.

Willing to Share: Israel and the USA

A different, very interesting sharing community of this threat has been set up when, immediately after the attacks, Israel positioned itself as the closest fellow in misery of the USA. Claiming that the September 11 attacks equal what Israel has been going through for decades, Israel both legitimised its own "war on terror" and offered security expertise. While not all actors accept this equation, especially economic actors are free to get on the "new threat" train rhetorically and create an alliance of shared threats. The new threats are tied together in the security notion employed first by the US and adapted by Israel and others: Homeland Security.

Institutionally, the partners in the construction and fight of the new threat come together in a "network of knowledge sharing and production relating to the development of 'counter-terrorism' technologies tied to Washington's 'Global War on terror' since 11 September 2001. An example of such a global 'counter-terrorism' network is the US government's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO)." (Kilibarda 2009 p.12) A new alliance of shared threats is thus constructed as of 9/11 between USA, Israel ("Homeland Security") and some EU countries.

In all, it seems that very different types of threats are in circulation – from very concrete tangible threats with little need to legitimise to abstract threats which require colourful narratives and imagery. Both types of threats can be used in terms of policies and interests, especially when they are shared and jointly constructed, as seen with the EU.

Privatisation of Security Functions

Already in 1977, an essay titled „Transfer of the police power to privates?" appeared in the German Journal for Legal Policy. Looking at the increasing privatisation of security functions, the former Constitutional Court judge Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem wonders what "political costs a market of fear" entails. "Politics and security industry together profit of communicating a world view with political implications. It advised the citizen to avoid risks and thus generally sustain what is existent." (Hoffmann-Riem 1977 p.279) Security, he argues, is not a product, but a police – and state – function.

Twenties years later, the picture has changed fundamentally not only in Germany, but worldwide. The 1970s controversy on the commodity character of security seems to be settled. Market studies emphasise the continually growing profits in ever diversifying contexts (VDI/VDE & ASW 2009). A German proponent of private security states that

> „What the caretaker is to the house owner, the factory security to the entrepreneur, and the steward to the head of an assembly, that is the private security service branch on a self-employed basis within the frame of outsourcing to the principal." (Stober 1996)

The increase in private security actors can be diagnosed for all countries in the project. A first important explanation can be found in the general growth of security regimes or security "production" as forwarded by the extended security notions. Several aspects of varying impact can be differentiated in this extension towards private actors in the countries analysed.

A first, long-term cause for security privatisation is rooted in the privatisation of societal spheres, for example of urban spaces. In some countries, the private premises of early industrialisation were the first private commercial entities to be protected by private services. The commercialisation of inner cities and the nascence of private spaces with public functions such as shopping malls contributed to the shift of security responsibilities towards the private owners. These socioeconomic and city planning developments are similar for all capitalist countries. In only recently transformed countries such as Poland, the effects of rebuild and visible new inequalities are especially tangible when the new elites create a demand for alarm systems within a few years. The growth in social inequalities is closely linked to the extension of security regimes through privatisation.

Secondly, public functions are sourced out to private actors when public security agencies are economised and downsized, or when technological competences are located within the private sector. This variant of public-private "cooperation" also enhances the private actors' political relevance. Some countries – Germany and the US, for example - have formally acknowledged the status of private actors within the overall security regime as indispensable. With regard to the service sector, this does not always directly lead to adequate regulation of the market, as the cases of Germany, Poland and the UK show – major scandals have shaken the mostly low-quality, cheap private security industry. As for the security technology industries, on the other hand, acknowledgement has partially been forced upon public agencies through sheer technology leadership.

This third dimension of privatisation of security functions is thus again one of extension. The rising technology content in the security field and market can be attributed to some extent to the rise of the network paradigm and the digitization and convergence of a range of technologies such as video and biometrics. The diffusion of information and communication technologies have created a security market of their own – IT security – and influenced the idea of "networked security". Systems integrators such as telecommunications companies, but also defence companies, are profiting from this convergence and extend their businesses to the security market. At the same time, public agencies make use of private infrastructure for their intelligence purposes – sometimes in public-private partnerships as in the USA, sometimes by force as is the case with the German data retention procedure. Last but not least, the security technology market is seen as one global battlefield for national economies in which to prevail. Germany issued a "high tech security technology strategy" and Israel benefits largely from its technology expertise in times of demand driven by US-Homeland Security expenditures.

It is striking that many of the security economies analysed followed similar patterns after 1989. This proves to be an economic focus event for especially the European countries – all security economies adapted to the sudden decline in demand and legitimisation through privatisation. Superfluous security experts and personnel had to be moved into new jobs in Poland and Germany. The following processes of privatisation were supported through "threat articulation" (organised crime, international terrorism, cyber crime), professionalization and a growing technology orientation.

Technology's New Role
The new role of technology within the described processes of extension and privatisation has already shown through: threats are technologically underlain – networked, using airplanes, targeting infrastructures -, and solutions are sought through technology as well.

The country reports have stressed the importance of the network paradigm and related processes of convergence, especially through digitization of technologies, for security regimes and economies. A whole new sector has emerged with the IT security industry in response to the new threats produced by the diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies themselves, and the spread of networks such as the Internet.

Threats have influenced the shape of national security technology economies, as the comparative analysis clearly shows. Israel and the US have historically been equipped with highly developed security industries including large defence industries. Civil security technologies such as CCTV have succeeded in the UK in particular, where threats to social order were strongly perceived.

In accordance with the extension of security notions, a "networked security" solution paradigm has risen, which favours technical solutions or socio-technical solutions over security services. Firstly, threats are perceived to have taken such complex shapes that they need to be countered with technological support – "equal fire power" is to be attained. Secondly, security services in most countries analysed suffer quality and image problems, while cutting-edge technological equipment always promises some (symbolic) credit to the employer – as seen in the case of CCTV in municipalities. Thirdly, technologies of all kinds are readily redefined into security technologies, especially through digitization and convergence.

Processes of privatisation are tightly interlinked with the rising technology content in security regimes, as has been argued above. The supply and demand for civil security technology equipment have surged as a consequence of privatisation of spaces and property. The case of Poland shows this link very clearly – growing social inequalities and new patterns of private property have nurtured a private security service and technology industry.

Yet, security economies are not threat determined, as National Reports indicate. Rather, globally "available" threats will be used by economic actors independently of their national situation in order to gain a foothold in a market that is widely perceived as skyrocketing (cf. Klein 2007). Prime example here is Israel, who was, based on its history, very well positioned in terms of high tech security when 9/11 triggered the creation of a Homeland Security marketplace. Kilibarda (2009) confirms the finding that Israel marketed its "know how" and "positioned itself as a major player in this niche market" (p.12). Somewhat differently, German systems integrators – both civil (telecommunications) and defence companies - enter the security market with a "networked security" rhetoric oriented at "new" terrorist threats. While these threats have never materialised in Germany, funding for security technologies is high and technology leadership is sought.

In conclusion, the global security technology market is perceived as a playing field by all competent actors independently of their threat proximity or security regime otherwise – important conditions seem to be high tech expertise in place and public funding.

CCTV and Biometrics
The comparison of CCTV and biometrics employment and policies among the analysed countries shows fundamental differences between these technologies and industries. While video technology for surveillance is a relatively simple and old technological device, biometrics is located much more in the scientific field and closely linked to basic research.

Video surveillance has been adopted widely at the local (municipal or organisational) level with the aims of crime deterrence, monitoring, subjective security raising and last but not least, symbolic policy (cf. Newburn 2001; Hempel 2007; Hempel and Metelmann 2005; Jones and Newburn 2002). Presented as a panacea in various settings, CCTV is generally aimed at social control rather than crime control or even detection of terrorist activities, as is frequently claimed. CCTV employment has also been contested mostly at the local level, and legal regulations are national, sometimes even regional. CCTV has certainly not made it to a European issue. A new twist to expectations in video surveillance has come with digital IP video networks. In combination with biometric software applications, hopes are pinned on this new converged technology, but results are still very heterogeneous when it comes to field tests. Still, digital video technology represents a functional leap that brings new actors in (cf. Norris 2003).

Modern digital/ optical biometrics have developed as a "techno-science" – most start ups originated in universities and are still closely linked to the loci of basic research. The significance attributed to biometric procedures and technologies is quite different from CCTV. While CCTV is a local technology, biometrics are perceived as the most abstract possibility of identification of humans – stripped of local issues, cultures, places and norms.

This characteristic is extremely important when adopting an EU integration perspective. As described above, problems of cooperation and interoperability between national systems of regulation, crime control, border control etc. are veiled and circumvented through the build up and employ of technological infrastructures such as databases. Technization fulfils a function of abstraction of national idiosyncrasies without really confronting the hindering differences. Biometric technology seems to fit in perfectly with this strategy: biometric identification uses data derived directly from the individual human being, not translated by a state via passport or database. The biometric data in digitized form dissolves all social, ethnic or other visible and attributed differences – it is a generic, global technology. What better way to create a common basis of security measures within a common security policy for the European Union? The problem of sovereignty and convergence seems overcome by technology.

Do Shared Threats Explain Similar Regime Developments?
It can be argued that the general shift towards law and order policy, zero tolerance and repressive penal systems throughout the European countries analysed and the US presents a common tendency that cannot be explained solely on the basis of changing political programmes. Rather, an increase in crime rates, social inequalities and tighter social control has enabled an extension of security policies apart from and before the formulation of common EU security policies or terrorist threats. These developments are connected to complex societal shifts within the big picture of late modernity globalised capitalism. It seems that threats and risks connected with modern society have indeed shaped the security regimes in this sense. The wider significance of this shift can be grasped in the now paradigmatic concept of prevention, which is closely coupled to the modern notion of risk.

Security today integrates an indefinite number of societal arenas that had traditionally been separated. Security policy strategies are linked to social and employment policies that try to tackle symptoms of social disintegration, as well as issues of environment, nutrition, demography, immigration and economic development. Wherever conditions of high insecurity are expected, security discourses gain credibility. Following the dictum of security, not only is the relationship

between citizen and state reorganised, but the political and the economic realms co-produce an industry of its own which in turn tends to subject every field of policy to the security logic.

The extension of security leads to the concatenation of diverse threats, hiding them behind diffuse and indefinite, but ever more "natural" formulas. Terms such as "transnational organised crime" (sometimes spelled with majors) render threats ubiquitous. Correspondingly, a discourse of the principal "vulnerability of modern societies" gains wide attention among today's security experts. While the shared threats of organised crime and terrorism certainly worked as a motor for European securitization processes and the tentative formulation of common security policies, it also served as legitimisation for measures of internal political interest. In a study comprising EU and non-EU states, the authors come to the conclusion that all countries undergo extensive law making and securitization processes in the wake of terrorist attacks, but that the point in time of these regulations was largely determined by internal politics (cf. Baukloh, Glaeßner, and Lorenz 2005)Interestingly, some countries (Germany, France) made use of the EU framework in order to circumvent national internal politics and law making procedures – a very problematic issue in terms of legitimacy.

Yet, the general politics of securitization seem to have been supported by a broad range of actors on the basis of the perceived threats. As for Poland, EU integration pressure exceeded terrorist threats by far as a powerful incentive for the adoption of current security policies and institution build. The comparison of Germany and Poland hints at how EU level security policy underlies a hegemonic discourse steered by powerful actors who handle the two policy levels carefully but impose policies on other member states. The question must therefore be posed: have threats have become global – or are discourses on threats being globalised in a hegemonic style? Threats posed to nation states obviously do not match up with the described regime developments – sometimes, transnational units are relevant arenas of policy, in other cases national idiosyncrasies persist. An area of tension between several levels can be drawn: the national, transnational and global level of threats and threat discourses. The discussion has shown that different patterns can be distinguished which do not fit in easily with these categories.

There is certainly no simple match between threats and security regimes – what could be termed "threat determinism". Rather, the reports provide evidence for dynamic processes of extension driven by interest and in need of legitimisation. These dynamics take place against the backdrop of the mentioned field of tension opened up by the globalising threat discourses and different levels of transnational security policy interaction.

C. Dynamics of Extension, Interest and the Need for Legitimisation

In this part, the theses so far discussed on a general level will be selectively illustrated through relevant findings from the countries analysed. The specific dynamics of extension, interest and legitimisation are central results of the National Reports of the partner countries.

Germany

An Extended Security Regime

As an EU and Schengen country, Germany shared the emerging threat of organised crime with other countries such as Poland after 1989. The current German discourse about new and changed threats is clearly connected to the focus event of 9/11, which is also a shared trans-nationalised threat. While this event did not induce the political consequences, it catalysed ongoing discourses and provided an already on-going remodelling of Germany's security architecture with an add-on legitimisation.

The speed with which the Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz (Fight against terrorism law) was proposed and passed makes it clear that initiatives were already on their way when the 9/11 focus event helped them fledge. Only details were discussed or criticised – the law was only handed to opposition members at 8:30pm in the evening before passing it the next day, making real criticism impossible (cf. Deggerich 2001). Bukow makes it clear that "laws which are relevant for security have been and are still passed with great majority in Germany" (Bukow 2005b p.7). Indeed, the Social Democrat Schily became a symbol of state expansion via security laws. The major impacts of the law were tighter measures against aliens and asylum seekers; a new §129b on "terrorist associations" not only in Germany, but abroad, that enables extensive surveillance. Measures such as the Anti-Terror-File, data retention of telecommunications and far-reaching competencies of the Federal Criminal Police are in no proportion to the threat experienced by Germany. Held against the actual threat of terrorism to Germany, it is obvious that political actors as well as economic actors make use of new rhetoric in order to attain their goals (cf. Bukow 2005a p.47).

> "The significance of the extended security notion for security practices has to be seen in a hindsight legitimisation and starting point for a comprehensive cooperation of all security agencies." (Heinrich and Lange 2009 p.258)

With its broad extension, security comes to be seen as a cross-cutting issue that can only be attained with a comprehensive approach – making all political fields subject to a security strategy. This entails the convergence of civil, internal and military foreign security, and the consequent geographical expansion of security claims into foreign territory.

Another effect of the extension with high relevance to the German security regime can be stated for the public civil security agencies: they expand in competences (legally) and in intelligence (information-wise). Not only does the military take on policing functions (abroad), the domestic police also strengthen connections with intelligence and secret services in a process of centralisation. The structure has already changed mightily through the use of information infrastructure especially on the part of the BKA, and through the series of laws shifting power "upwards" to the federal level of security agencies. To sum up, most commentators observe a subversion of the separation imperative, a foundation of the German constitutional state, in favour of a rise in power of (some) security agencies.

Internal Politics in a Supra-National Arena

The supra-national level has been spotted by commentators as a convenient detour around the German parliament in many cases for Internal Security interests of German politicians. Germany has particularly used its powerful position within the EU framework to set the security agenda according to its interests of networking, extension and centralisation. The strategic character of its engagement

becomes visible when taking into account that some legal changes forwarded by Germany at EU level were then slowed down in the process of implementation into national law.

Germany's specific use of "intermediary" structures shows in the Prüm Treaty process (cf. Luif 2007 p.8). Germany's Minister of the Interior Otto Schily, a Social Democrat, proposed a closer cooperation to some of his neighbouring colleagues in 2003. The initiative was grounded in dissatisfaction with the security architecture after the Schengen Agreement had erased the central European boarders around Germany. The perceived threat was transnational, especially organised crime, which was now free to move between Germany and neighbours. German officials tried to establish the "Rasterfahndung" (grid profiling) – profile searches of databases with extensive data – within the Prüm framework. This type of profiling had been used during the 1970s and 1980s in Germany in order to get hold of left-wing terrorists and their supporters, and had been a moot point in terms of civil liberties infringement back then. This suggestion as well as a centralisation of databases was renounced by the other countries. After the still far-reaching conclusion of the Treaty, other EU member states rushed to join the extra-EU framework. This has been interpreted as either underlining the need for such a Treaty, or as a symptom of an "electronic border" built up by Prüm (cf. Luif 2007 pp.16). Prüm was then incorporated in the EU framework in 2007.

It has also been reconstructed that many of the EU laws on the fight against terrorism, data retention measures or the interconnected EU databases have in fact been initiated by Germany (cf. Bukow 2005a pp.58). This is true for the use of biometric data in identity documents and databases such as the European Visa Information System database: Whilst the German parliament had determined the need for a specific law concerning biometric data, the EU and the US overrode the decision with a quick agreement on fingerprints and pictures, so when the European Council decided on an Identity Card Act in 2004, German law had to be changed accordingly without consultation of the parliament. The same procedure worked for the retention of telecommunications data in 2005.

In all, it can be concluded that Germany (oftentimes in cooperation with France) unfolded some enormous impact on the security architecture parallel to, but especially within the EU framework. EU security regulation can be seen – in many cases - not as the source of impact, but as a detour taken by domestic politicians in order to avoid the discussions and institutions hindering new laws – in short, the general public or democratic basis represented by the Parliament.

Focus on the Security Technology Market

While there is evidence that no "demand pull" from the side of security clients can be diagnosed (cf. VDI/VDE & ASW 2009 pp.134), powerful support is given to security technology developers and producers. All discourses mapped in this report advance security technologies, and public funding is spent on it: In its "Research Programme for Civil Security", the Federal Ministry of Education and Research funds security oriented research leading to "innovative solutions". In 2010, some EUR 123 million are spent on projects dealing with "scenario-based security research" and "the study of generic technologies within the framework of mixed-technology networks, which are needed in many scenarios". The programme is part of the BMBF's "High-tech Strategy", putting special emphasis on the material outcomes of the research:

> "Research, legislation, regulatory support, international cooperation and procurement in the area of civil security are considered to form an integrated whole. An objective of our High-tech Strategy is to increase the competitiveness of companies which contribute to security and to achieve technological leadership in specific security technologies." (BMBF n.d.)

The programme is thus strongly oriented towards both types of Technology Producers (Systems Integrators and Specialised Hardware Producers). Threats and issues emphasised in the programme are terrorist attacks aimed at critical infrastructures and crisis management.

Israel

Threat Proximity

Threats need not be constructed for Israel. The threat to the national security of Israel is and has been a self-evident state and taken for granted ever since its foundation. No elaborate discourses, images and rhetoric are invested as is the case in countries like Germany – which provides an entirely different framework for the Israeli security actors. The need for legitimisation of securitisation activities seems almost non-existent. Still, the simple thesis that there has always been a "total security" notion comprising Internal and Foreign Security based on the existential threat – to vanish from the map – must be reviewed.

Shifting Notions of Security

The Israeli report provides some evidence that this claim is far too simple. It seems true that from the beginning of Israel's existence as a state, a constant threat from neighbouring countries has led political actors to focus on what we call Foreign Security or Defence. Yet, a notion of Public Security or Internal Security was developed the 1970s, an "institutional turning point", as the Israeli team calls it. When in the 1974 hostage drama 21 children were murdered by terrorists after a complete failure of the military forces to adapt their strategy and means to this situation, it became clear that a civil institution needs to be entrusted with the lives of civil persons. The Yamam, a Special Police Unit within the police, was founded.

A second impulse to intensify Internal Security structures independently from the army was the First Intifada (1987-1993) which brought large civilian crowds to the streets, calling for crowd control by the police rather than military intervention. In terms of civil security, it is interesting to note that a National Emergency Management Authority was not installed until 2006 after the Lebanon War had transcended the borders in an entirely new quality. While most military activity of Israel had taken place outside of civilian settlements or even consisted of territorial gain (during the 1967 Six Day War), the missiles actually reached the population this time around.

It could thus be argued that even though the territorial situation could not differ more, there is some similarity between Israel and the USA in the way that the focus has shifted from activities abroad to a complementing Internal Security, Public Security or Homeland Security, as they call it, after a severe focus event such as 9/11 or the Second Lebanon War. The focus events have transferred the war zone into the national, and what is more, civilian-populated territory.

State Defence and the Private Industry

Israel has historically seen strong intermingling of the army and the military industry. The army generally is of central importance for Israeli society and economy – it is a think tank especially for high tech sectors, but also the place where elites pass through. After decades of skyrocketing defence industry growth, the sector saw some contraction during the more peaceful 1980s and following the end of the Cold War; at the same time, military aid transferred to Israel by the United States increased, albeit imposing the condition that 75% of the military aid had to be spent in the United States. Israel cannot be discussed without the USA, especially when it comes to the security economy.

While the state kept buying in arms, the defence industry shrinked – but the private sector blossomed. In terms of financial numbers, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute claims, Israel came in fourth in exports amounting to $bn.4.4. In accordance with the Israel National Report and (2009), SIPRI claims that Israel is

> "trying to exploit the emerging niche on the international market for refurbishing military equipment. Israel has a technologically advanced arms industry, which has been built up in close cooperation with the USA. The size of the arms industry is being reduced as a matter of conscious policy, but there is little interest in diversification and the companies are strongly oriented to increasing their share on the international market." (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 2009)

The Israeli report comes to the strong conclusion that the economy in fact needs the threats – more than any other country observed because of its historical path dependence. And contrary to other countries analysed, no legitimacy needs to be raised through the construction of threats[1].

Poland

Changing Threats and Security Notion

Poland's history has brought about major system changes with fundamental security redefinitions. Threats have shifted from territorial threat to organised crime and growing societal inequalities. Crime rates already increased in the 1980s and surged after the breakdown of the socialist system. Violence, professionalism and internationality of organised criminal groups grew (cf. Baukloh et al. 2005 p.247). Terrorism, on the other hand, never really played a role in Poland's security regime.

Rapid system change to capitalism led to a demand of new rich elites for protection of their property. At this regional level, security regimes are extended through security service and technology instalment such as alarm systems. In all, the security notion has shifted remarkably in Poland over the past decades. Focused on military security and integrity initially, security has come to a new meaning after the end of the Cold War and with the EU integration process. The National Security Strategy today classifies a total of eight types of security. Including social security and economic security, this is the broadest security notion available.

The distinction of an internal and foreign security has only started after 9/11 and is expressed in the new strategy. At the same time, convergence occurs between civil and military security as is the case in the other countries, for example when the Military University of Technology (MUT) extended its interest to civil security after it lost much of its justification. In terms of safety-security convergence, the Act on Crisis Management of 2007 and the Governmental Security Centre as well as the National Security Strategy show the timeline similarities with other US-oriented countries such as Israel: a safety-security convergence starts as of 2001, after the Homeland Security term was coined. The Platform of Homeland Security connects some 580 researchers and practitioners.

Institutional Change: Post-Socialist Police and EU Integration

The post-socialist security agencies underwent processes of depoliticization and decentralisation into local structures of 49 voivodships. Some 3027 officers were laid off, which is comparable to the

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[1] Correspondingly, the websites of Israeli high tech systems integrators mentioned in the case studies are somewhat less fraught with images and rhetoric than e.g. the German ones.

situation in the former German Democratic Republic, where personnel was set free. Also similarly, Poland's private security sector started growing – probably absorbing this workforce.

Organized crime prevention, drug prevention, operational and exploratory services and investigation services are still subject to supervision at the national level – this in analogue to the structure that other federally governed countries such as Germany have started to set up with the BKA-LKA distinction in tasks.

In general, broad institutional adaptations have been implemented very successfully "on the fast track" in order to fulfil EU accession criteria in 2004 and Schengen in 2007 (cf. Matthes 2005). The EU integration process is seen as the main driving force behind Polish security regime changes by most commentators. On the side of the benefits, modernisation of security institutions and technology and higher juridical standards can be listed; on the cost side, large financial investments had to be made for new systems (SIS) and border facilities (124 million Euros). Other national regulations and legal initiatives are also oriented at EU and Schengen discussions and standards, such as the central database for passport documents, criminal law, and institutional changes (Baukloh et al. 2005 p.254).

A Nascent Security Economy

As mentioned above, a private security sector started growing in the 1990s, when crime rates were high and wealthy people wished to protect their valuables. The service market remains quite fragmented and small-sized, local and cheap, featuring a negative image. Regulation has been implemented in 1997 after a row of scandals with the Act on the Protection of persons and property. It attempts to regulate the sector, and does so more thoroughly than e.g. Germany: more training for licences is required, and more competences are granted.

While high profile information technology expertise is considerable in Poland, it does not connect to the security and technology market forcefully – maybe because of a lack of major (transnational) players in the field. The security technology market is relatively small consisting of young firms and featuring little innovativeness; security actors have little expertise to sell. Polish companies have accordingly not engaged in the security technology competition after 2001 as fiercely as Israeli and German actors.

United Kingdom

Security and Social Control

Regarding security terms, the UK sticks to its twofold notion of national security and public security/ order and has not take on new terms such as Homeland Security. Internal Security is a term used in the context of EU discourses. Yet, the typical blurring of security dimensions is visible when looking at strategy formulation and institution change. The National Security Strategy of 2008 effectively incorporates the idea of "networked security" forwarded by the consulting Demos institute, but uses the terms "interdependent world", „globalisation", and „global security".

Organised crime and terrorism entered the discourse in the 1990s. The focus here was somewhat different from other European countries, since organised crime was most pressingly observed by Schengen countries fearing Eastern European crime mobility; UK's perspective was more towards the Commonwealth and its own multiethnic society. Secondly, UK's terrorism notion was shaped by the concrete threats looming in the Northern Ireland conflict and other domestic militant political activity. No legal definition of terrorism was made until 2000/ 2001, when all these types of terrorism

were merged with the new "international" Islamist terrorism (which has a less-noticed home grown aspect).

Institutionally comparable to Germany, a centralisation process of the Security Regime can be shown for the UK. The conflict between "local policing" and central state institutions has favoured the latter when the "organised crime" discourse took the stage (Glaeßner 2005 p. 89). The 1990s saw a number of institution founding: An Organised Crime and International Crime Directorate were created within the Ministry of the Interior in 1996 as well as the National Criminal Intelligence Service in 1992; regional institutions were merged into the National Crime Squad in 1998. Also similar to the German internal politics, the 9/11 focus event was leveraged by politicians for changes in asylum and immigration policy (cf. Glaeßner 2005 p.99).

The UK shows a clear picture of development towards law and order, a repressive penal system and extended social control, for example through criminalization of anti-social behaviour. When property and violence crime surged and ethnic conflicts surfaced, CCTV surveillance was forwarded by public security agencies. Accordingly, the story of security in the UK can be told as a story of CCTV.

Focus on CCTV

The spread of CCTV surveillance in the UK is outstanding in comparison to other countries and is the expression of strong social order and common sense cultures, but also of shifts within the security regime. The 1970s saw a reversal of policy, with rehabilitation taking a back seat and more punitive methods of punishment being implemented. CCTV took centre stage as a solution to rising crime rates in the 1980s. It was then being used for a variety of control and surveillance purposes including the Miners' Strike (1984/85) and in football grounds (commencing 1985). The UK National Report diagnoses a general cultural shift in the UK with regard to peer-to-peer surveillance which culminated with the recorded murder of 2-year old James Bulger in 1993 and was additionally sustained by the fear of attack in the UK from the IRA, leading to security measures such as the London "Ring of Steel". Networks of state bodies, independent institutions, and commercial organisations work together to promote and utilise CCTV. CCTV historically fits in with developments in policing – "technopolicing" – which widened the gap between police and the public. Growing social inequalities and increase in private spaces led to the development of the private security sector similarly to the US, Germany or Poland.

Interestingly, in the UK, the not-so-new threat of terrorism that has materialised in 2005 in London is again answered with CCTV investments, but also with campaigns for citizen awareness and co-policing. Citizen involvement in socio-technical networks has become important for the police in their anti-terrorism campaigns, for example through reporting and surveillance on the part of citizens.

In comparison to the other EU countries analysed, the UK security regime developments are hardly related to the EU framework and its search for a common security policy. It is not a full member of the Schengen area and has only conditionally incorporated the European Human Rights Convention into national law (cf. Baukloh et al. 2005). Nevertheless, the UK has been very active in propagating cross-border police cooperation. To sum up, it seems that the UK security regime evolution can be described very broadly as the rise of a "culture of control" on a societal level, employing an extended security notion of stability. It relates to culture rather than technological means of surveillance, which simply don't fulfil "networked security" hopes or fears as yet, as the National Report concludes.

United States of America

Security after 9/11: Homeland Security

National security prior to 9/11 was clearly external security in the USA. Internal security and personal security, on the other hand, belonged to the "local" level of crime and social order. Since the end of the Cold War, the meaning of security has been in flux. Missing its one official military enemy, the US engaged to become a "global police force" following an extended notion of security that took the instability of nation states across the globe as a challenge for national security. While threats became polycentric, they moved conceptually "inwards" to US security policy, and finally inwards to actual US territory with the September 11 attacks of 2001. The terrorist attacks killed nearly 3000 people and are referred to as terrorist "mass murder", thus representing a widely recognised caesura in the security of not only the United States, but the western hemisphere.

9/11 obviously marked the prime focus event structuring and, especially, legitimising the US security regime today. Hereafter, security was extended massively: Internal and national security converged as well as safety and security – an all-comprising concept of security culminating in the official "Homeland Security". Following the National Report, the new security approach can be understood as "networked security", where both terrorist threats are perceived as networked socially and technologically and security solutions must be "networked". Global policing as well as domestic intelligence are expressions of this "war on terror".

Total Information Awareness after 9/11

While many actors have adopted rhetoric of "networked security", the US have started building it and investing heavily in new institutions. When in the aftermath of the attacks it became tangible how much "information" – that is, traces of the future terrorists could be found, the idea of "information awareness" came to the fore. The discourse implies that had the "dots been connected", the attacks could have been prevented. The US consequently invested in the development of information technology and processing methods and worked on connecting hitherto separate information sources in order to bring all data together and get the big picture.

The Defence Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) founded the Office of Information Awareness (OIA) to "imagine, develop, apply, integrate, demonstrate and transition information technologies, components and prototype, closed-loop information systems that will counter asymmetric threats by achieving total information awareness." The Total Information Awareness (TIA) project started in 2002 in order to assimilate and synthesize the vast commercial and private databases in the US, but was defunded by the US Congress after public protest. Homeland security through total information awareness is the state's attempt to know the unknowable: to leverage informational systems public and private against the chaos that is an enemy without borders who still can deploy sophisticated methods to achieve destructive ends. This total awareness entails some strong public-private blurring; for example the NYPD Shield is a public-private partnership that is designed to share information with the private sector about terrorism related information.

Essentially, this vision is a variant of the 30 year old cybernetic approach that was - among others - prominent in terrorist-stricken Germany where Federal Criminal Police head Horst Herold claimed the right for the police to "connect the dots". The scientific approach to recognizing threats and providing security has certainly fostered security economies in the US and elsewhere.

Security Economy Boom

In the case of the US, a "government pull" can thus be diagnosed. The government has allocated heavy investments after 9/11 (not to mention defence expenses). Legitimisation is still widely perceived as given. The effects extend well beyond the US economy though, as the discussion of Israeli marketing advantages showed. Ultimately, security service providers, technology producers, consultants and high tech systems integrators almost in all countries analysed refer to the US security notion and threat perception when advertising their products and creating legitimacy. 9/11 is the image behind the rhetoric of an "era of permanent terrorist threat" that is leveraged all over the world – independently of local threat levels – in order to gain market shares.

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